Tables and Charts up. I've spent some time polishing the third and sixth pages. They're done for a while. The biggest change is that I finally got around to putting up link to the New York Times "THE END OF PENSIONS" article. I consider it a must read. If the company specific pension system goes down, as taxpayers and participants in a hopefully healthy and surviving pension plan, we might end up picking up some unexpected passengers.
The conclusion of My Most Gnarley Mutual Fund Adventure; The IDETX Chapter.
Monetary policy had been loose in the late 90's; cash was there to be had, but the rates were going higher. The market as a whole was not doing well at the end of the nineties. Much of the economy was suffering under the high rates, but most of the loose cash had run downhill and was piling up in the corner that held telecom, tech, and the internet where a good old fashioned stock bubble was underway. So there was this money management company called Janus and one of their funds was called Janus Twenty Fund. It was/is a hard charging, concentrated, high risk fund. It held twenty or thirty of the hottest stocks. No safety in diversification, but a lot of horsepower if they got it right. When the market narrowed in the late 90's and fewer and fewer stock went higher and higher, they were RIGHT. CLICKONNIT!
Other funds in the Janus family saw what was going on and bought in to the same scenario. Other funds in other families did likewise. During the last stages of the bubble, it was amazing where you could find those same hot stocks. Sector funds totally away from tech etc held these stocks (very quietly) because it was the only way to show any performance and without performance, the client's money went away. These stocks were bought and bought and bought. Many funds acquired outsized positions because these stocks worked, money came in, and it was a no brainer move to buy more of what got ya there. Enter my position in IDETX. The Idex Fund family runs a lot of funds and contracts with outside advisors. My alternate fund to FPRAX was Idex JCC Growth (IDETX). The "J" stood for Janus. I had traded in my value fund for a ride with the Janus hot money boyz.
I rode Idex and their Janus hot money clone fund up to the top along with everyone else who held the same hot money stocks. When we all hit the top as per "New Paradigm or Mean Reversion?" by Jeremy Grantham & Jack Gray. Sep/Oct 1999; Investment Policy Magazine (Google it), I figured that the Idex managers would step off at the top just as the elevator started to go down. Sell the top, book the profits, and I'd live happily ever after. Instead, the managers at Idex actually were only hired hands who owned the same stocks big time back at the ranch. Actually everybody on the Street owned the same stocks and the doorway out was not wide enough to let everybody out at once. I coulda sold my IDETX in the time it took to get a letter with a signature guaranty downtown. Instead I stood by for part of the ride down as everybody bled their positions into the market, driving the prices lower over more than a year.
Opps! I just ran outa weekend. Stay tooned. No change in the 401a portfolio pending developmnents. Fifty two percent cash. Enuf said.
[ view entry ] ( 939 views ) [ 0 trackbacks ] permalink The conclusion of My Most Gnarley Mutual Fund Adventure; The IDETX Chapter.
Monetary policy had been loose in the late 90's; cash was there to be had, but the rates were going higher. The market as a whole was not doing well at the end of the nineties. Much of the economy was suffering under the high rates, but most of the loose cash had run downhill and was piling up in the corner that held telecom, tech, and the internet where a good old fashioned stock bubble was underway. So there was this money management company called Janus and one of their funds was called Janus Twenty Fund. It was/is a hard charging, concentrated, high risk fund. It held twenty or thirty of the hottest stocks. No safety in diversification, but a lot of horsepower if they got it right. When the market narrowed in the late 90's and fewer and fewer stock went higher and higher, they were RIGHT. CLICKONNIT!
;)
Other funds in the Janus family saw what was going on and bought in to the same scenario. Other funds in other families did likewise. During the last stages of the bubble, it was amazing where you could find those same hot stocks. Sector funds totally away from tech etc held these stocks (very quietly) because it was the only way to show any performance and without performance, the client's money went away. These stocks were bought and bought and bought. Many funds acquired outsized positions because these stocks worked, money came in, and it was a no brainer move to buy more of what got ya there. Enter my position in IDETX. The Idex Fund family runs a lot of funds and contracts with outside advisors. My alternate fund to FPRAX was Idex JCC Growth (IDETX). The "J" stood for Janus. I had traded in my value fund for a ride with the Janus hot money boyz.
I rode Idex and their Janus hot money clone fund up to the top along with everyone else who held the same hot money stocks. When we all hit the top as per "New Paradigm or Mean Reversion?" by Jeremy Grantham & Jack Gray. Sep/Oct 1999; Investment Policy Magazine (Google it), I figured that the Idex managers would step off at the top just as the elevator started to go down. Sell the top, book the profits, and I'd live happily ever after. Instead, the managers at Idex actually were only hired hands who owned the same stocks big time back at the ranch. Actually everybody on the Street owned the same stocks and the doorway out was not wide enough to let everybody out at once. I coulda sold my IDETX in the time it took to get a letter with a signature guaranty downtown. Instead I stood by for part of the ride down as everybody bled their positions into the market, driving the prices lower over more than a year.
Opps! I just ran outa weekend. Stay tooned. No change in the 401a portfolio pending developmnents. Fifty two percent cash. Enuf said.
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